Abstract
Introduction
In time dependent markets, such as power markets, a set of consecutive time slots are often traded simultaneously. However, although the participants may have various types of dependencies and constraints between the time slots, there is typically no, or very weak, support for the expression of such dependencies. In this article, we propose a trading mechanism that allows for a fairly large flexibility in expressing time dependencies, at the same time as it is computationally tractable. The computational aspects are important since the most general way to allow the expression of time dependencies is by a combinatorial auction, which presents us with an NP-hard computational problem. Therefore, it is interesting to have a trading mechanism which (i) allows for sufficient flexibility, (ii) is natural and understandable for participants, and (iii) has a low computational complexity.
Our mechanism has some carefully selected combinatorial features that increase the market flexibility compared to markets where each time period is treated as an independent good. The gain is that it enables participants to express preferences more accurately and an improved market outcome.
Main Idea
We consider a market for a set of consecutive time slots (hours). A bid is assumed to be given as a continuous (positive or negative) demand function, expressing one of following:
1. hourly bids: separate bids for each hour. If there are k different time periods (hours), all hourly bids may be aggregated into k demand functions, see Figure 1 , 2. block bids: bids on the same volume each hour. All block bids may be aggregated into a single demand function, 3. adaptive consumer bids: bids describing a consumer demand that is not related to any specific hour; the consumer is prepared to buy whenever the price is low enough. All adaptive consumer bids may be aggregated into a single demand function, 4. adaptive producer bids: Corresponding to the adaptive consumer bids.
Each bidder can give k + 3 different demand functions, hence we say that there are k + 3 bidding tracks.
... The four types of bids allow for a fairly flexible market. Compared to a fully implemented combinatorial market, the hourly bids correspond to single bids, block bids correspond to traditional combinatorial bids expressing synergies, and the adaptive bids corresponds to XOR bids, expressing complementarity.
Problem Formulation
We state the problem as follows: Given one market with the four bid types, compute
• a price p * i for each hour i, and • an allocation of the adaptive bids, such that supply meets demand, i.e. to determine a price vector p * :
where
The existence of a solution is shown in a technical report [2] , in the following we show how to compute the solution. Prerequisites used are that demand is continuous and decreasing in price, and that the goods traded on the adaptive sub-markets are divisible.
As said above, supply and demand bids are assumed to be given as continuous (positive and negative) demand functions, expressed as sample vectors. The bids are aggregated along the separate tracks, giving a set of demand functions, one for each track. These functions give full information on supply and demand and an equilibrium can be calculated without any further communication. An equilibrium is expressed as a set of prices where the excess demand for each hour on the market as a whole, but not necessarily on each bidding track, is zero. The outcome of the trade depends on a trade or reallocation between on one hand the hourly submarkets and on the other the block and the adaptive tracks.
Algorithm
On a high level, the algorithm can be described as a binary search over the volume t b reallocated between the block the hourly tracks. For each iteration in the loop a set of equilibrium prices (relative t b ) of the hourly and adaptive tracks is determined.
For the notations in the algorithm description we need some definitions. First the demand functions. The (t b , t a,i ) .
The following algorithm gives a strategy for the search for an optimum. Details on the computations follows the algorithm description.
Algorithm 4.1 (Determination of prices) { pick a value on t b ; (I) while (|p
∀h (t b , t a ) − p b (t b )| > 1 ){ for all i set the material balance to t b ; (II) compute adaptive demand; (III) determine p ∀h (t b , t a ) & p b (t b ); (IV) if(p ∀h (t b , t a ) − p b (t b ) > 1 ) raise t b ; ( V ) if(p ∀h (t b , t a ) − p b (t b ) < − 1 ) lower t b ; } announce prices; }
Algorithm Details
We give the details on the algorithm step by step: (I) Excess block demand level. The excess demand on the block market, t b , is the main search variable of Algorithm 4.1. Pick a start value on t b .
(II) Adjustment of the material balance. The material balance line of the hourly actors is adjusted to compensate for t b , see Figure 2 . By the adjustment, the equilibrium price changes for the hour under observation. In Figure 2 , p i (0, 0) equals the equilibrium price with no trade between sub-markets, and p i (t b , 0) is the equilibrium price when t b is traded with the block but no trade has taken place with any adaptive actor.
(III) Determination of the adaptive demand. The reallocation between time dependent actors and time independent ones requires some special attention. Any reallocation between time dependent actors bound to different time periods has to be avoided. To prevent it, the search for an optimal allocation is based on parts of their demand functions only. For for each hour we define two new demand functions as follows:
Definition. 4.4 For all prices p we define the function d
We define two new aggregate demand functions expressing all positive and negative hourly demand, respectively:
Definition. 4.5 For all prices p and hours i we define d
The equilibrium prices related to the two adaptive sides are determined using a binary search based aggregation of (i) d It is obvious that if there is a reallocation, it can reduce the price of more than one high demand hour, and raise the price of more than one low demand hour.
(IV) Determination of prices, including p ∀h (t b , t a ). Determine the price for each hour i, p i (t b , t a,i ). From the set of hourly equilibrium prices p ∀h (t b , t a ) is computed as it is expressed in Definition 4.3 1 .
(V) Breaking condition. When the difference between p ∀h (t b , t a ) and p b (t b ) is sufficiently small to be considered zero the search is ended and the set of prices is fixed.
We conclude that the final equilibrium price within a specific hour is depending on both its own demand and a reallocation between this hour and (i) the block and (ii) at most one of the adaptive sub-markets. (h log s 1 log s 2 ) .
Algorithm 4.1 Determines an Equilibrium
The proof is given in the technical report [2] .
Example
To show the behaviour of the algorithm we set up a small example with a two hour block size and walk through one step of the iteration. The enumeration of the example is the same as in the algorithm description.
(I) At this iteration step, the block excess demand, t b is set to four. As a consequence, the equilibrium price of the block market changes, see Figure 3 . 
